Delegated Activism and Disclosure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Delegated Activism and Disclosure By Amil Dasgupta Konstantinos
Mutual funds hold large blocks of shares in many major corporations. Practitioners and regulators alike have been concerned that mutual funds use their proxy votes in a promanagement manner in order to garner lucrative pensions administration contracts, thus hindering shareholder value. Such concerns led the SEC to mandate the disclosure of mutual fund proxy votes starting in 2003. We present a...
متن کاملDelegated Bargaining and Renegotiation
This paper examines the commitment e ect of delegated bargaining when renegotiation of the delegation contract cannot be ruled out. We consider a seller who can either bargain face-to-face with a prospective buyer or hire an intermediary to bargain on her behalf. The intermediary is able to interrupt his negotiation with the buyer to renegotiate the delegation contract. In this model, the time ...
متن کاملDelegated Path Validation and Delegated Path Discovery Protocol Requirements
Status of this Memo This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Abstract This document specifies the requirements for Delegated Path Validation (DPV) and Delegated Path Discovery (DPD) for Public Key Certificates. It also specifies the requirements for DPV and DPD policy management.
متن کاملWhen Does Institutional Investor Activism Increase Shareholder Value?: The Carbon Disclosure Project
This paper presents the first empirical test of the financial impacts of institutional investor activism towards climate change. Specifically, we study the conditions under which share prices are increased for the Financial Times (FT) Global 500 companies due to participation in the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a consortium of institutional investors with $57 trillion in assets. We find no ...
متن کاملStrategic Trade and Delegated Competition∗
Strategic trade theory has been criticized on the grounds that its predictions are overly sensitive to modeling assumptions. Applying recent results in duopoly theory, this paper considers three-stage games in which governments choose subsidies, firms’ owners choose incentive schemes for their managers, and then the managers compete in the product market. We show that if firms’ owners have suff...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1652148