Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information
We consider equilibrium timing decisions in a model with a large number of players and informational externalities. The players have private information about a common payo¤ parameter that determines the optimal time to invest. They learn from each other in real time by observing past investment decisions. We develop new methods of analysis for such large games, and we give a full characterizat...
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Many economic situations are modeled as stopping problems. Examples are timing of market entry decisions, search, and irreversible investment. We analyze a principalagent problem where the principal and the agent have di erent preferences over stopping rules. The agent privately observes a signal that in uences his own and the principal's payo . Based on his observation the agent decides when t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.022