Delay and Deadlines: Freeriding and Information Revelation in Partnerships
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.2.163