Defusing epistemic relativism

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Defusing epistemic relativism

This paper explores the question of whether there is an interesting form of specifically epistemic relativism available, a position which can lend support to claims of a broadly relativistic nature but which is not committed to relativism about truth. It is argued that the most plausible rendering of such a view turns out not to be the radical thesis that it is often represented as being. 0. On...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Synthese

سال: 2008

ISSN: 0039-7857,1573-0964

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9278-2