Deflationism beyond arithmetic

Formulating deflationism

I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) ”For all p, is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not pr...

Beyond the Arithmetic

A Critique of Deflationism

The past century has witnessed two types of philosophical debates over the concept of truth. In the first, substantive, type of debate we find rival theories of truth put forward that seem to have, and whose proponents have taken them to have, significant metaphysical and epistemological implications. An early example of this type is the debate in the early 1900s between the British Idealists (...

Reliabilism and Deflationism

In this article I examine several issues concerning reliabilism and deflationism. I critique Alvin Goldman’s account of the key differences between correspondence and deflationary theories and his claim that reliabilism can be combined only with those truth theories that maintain a commitment to truthmakers. I then consider how reliability could be analysed from a deflationary perspective and s...

Minimalism, Deflationism, and Paradoxes∗

This paper argues against a broad category of deflationist theories of truth. It does so by asking two seemingly unrelated questions. The first is about the well-known logical and semantic paradoxes: Why is there no strengthened version of Russell’s paradox, as there is a strengthened version of the Liar paradox? Oddly, this question is rarely asked. It does have a fairly standard answer, which...