Default values, criteria and constructivism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Cognitive Science
سال: 1980
ISSN: 0364-0213
DOI: 10.1016/s0364-0213(80)80011-5