Default and liquidation timing under asymmetric information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Default and liquidation timing under asymmetric information
We consider a dynamic model in which shareholders delegate a manager, who observes private information about running and liquidation costs of the firm, to operate the firm. We analytically derive the shareholders’ optimal contract contingent on the cost structure of the firm. The information asymmetries change the high-cost firm’s default and liquidation timing. Even if the liquidation value is...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Operational Research
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0377-2217
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.038