Deep Learning—Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Efficient Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

This survey considers the following setting. A seller wants to sell a set of indivisible goods. A set of buyers are interested in buying the goods. Buyers have private values for bundles of goods they are interested in buying. The seller’s objective is to allocate the goods to the buyers efficiently (maximizing the total utility of buyers). Since the values of buyers are private information, th...

Chapter 2: Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

ITERATIVE COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS : ACHIEVING ECONOMIC AND COMPUTATIONALEFFICIENCYDavid

ITERATIVE COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS: ACHIEVING ECONOMIC AND COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY David Christopher Parkes Supervisor: Lyle H. Ungar This thesis presents new auction-based mechanisms to coordinate systems of selfinterested and autonomous agents, and new methods to design such mechanisms and prove their optimality. Computation is increasingly carried out on open networks, with self-interested pr...

Information Feedback in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Auctions have been getting increasing attention in computer science and economics, as they provide an efficient solution to resource allocation problems with self-interested agents. E-Commerce and finance have emerged as some of their largest application fields. The need for new auction mechanisms that allow complex bids such as bundle or multi-attribute bids has been raised in many situations....