Declination as a Metric to Detect Partisan Gerrymandering

Partisan and Bipartisan Gerrymandering∗

This paper analyzes the optimal partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering policies in a model with electoral competitions in policy positions and transfer promises. With complete freedom in redistricting, partisan gerrymandering policy generates the most one-sidedly biased district profile, while bipartisan gerrymandering generates the most polarized district profile. In contrast, with limited fre...

Optimal partisan gerrymandering

We look ae the problem of devising an optimal gerrymander from the standpoint of the political party in control of the redistricting process in a singlemember district system involving two-party competition. In an electoral universe with uncertainty, we show that the optimal partisan gerrymander is different from the classic recipe for partisan gerrymandering if parties are concerned with the l...

The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry

While the Supreme Court in Bandemer v. Davis found partisan gerrymandering to be justiciable, no challenged redistricting plan in the subsequent 20 years has been held unconstitutional on partisan grounds. Then, in Vieth v. Jubilerer, five justices concluded that some standard might be adopted in a future case, if a manageable rule could be found. When gerrymandering next came before the Court,...

The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC

While the Supreme Court in Bandemer v. Davis found partisan gerrymandering to be justiciable, no challenged redistricting plan in the subsequent 20 years has been held unconstitutional on partisan grounds. Then, in Vieth v. Jubilerer, five justices concluded that some standard might be adopted in a future case, if a manageable rule could be found. When gerrymandering next came before the Court,...

The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering