Decision Theory for Agents with Incomplete Preferences

نویسندگان
چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences

Orthodox decision theory gives no advice to agents who hold two goods to be incommensurate in value because such agents will have incomplete preferences. According to standard treatments, rationality requires complete preferences, so such agents are irrational. Experience shows, however, that incomplete preferences are ubiquitous in ordinary life. In this paper, we aim to do two things: () sho...

متن کامل

Weighted Utility Theory with Incomplete Preferences

This paper axiomatizes the representations of weighted utility theory with incomplete preferences. These include the general multiple weighted utility representation as well as special cases of multiple utilities or multiple weights only.

متن کامل

Complementarity with incomplete preferences

This paper extends the formulation of complementarity in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) to the case of incomplete but acyclic preferences. It is shown that the problem can be reformulated as one with complete but intransitive preferences. In this case, quasi-supermodularity and single-crossing on their own do not guarantee either monotone comparative statics or equilibrium existence in pure strateg...

متن کامل

Principals’ preferences for agents with social preferences

This study explores a nested representation of ethical, moral, social identity, motivated, opportunistic and reciprocal agent preferences to characterize screening contracts in a principal–agent model under adverse selection. This leads to a ranking of the type of social preferences that principals should seek in agents, based upon the information rents associated with each agent type. When mor...

متن کامل

Decision Theory with Resource-Bounded Agents

There have been two major lines of research aimed at capturing resource-bounded players in game theory. The first, initiated by Rubinstein (), charges an agent for doing costly computation; the second, initiated by Neyman (), does not charge for computation, but limits the computation that agents can do, typically by modeling agents as finite automata. We review recent work on applying both app...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Australasian Journal of Philosophy

سال: 2013

ISSN: 0004-8402,1471-6828

DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2013.843576