Decentralization and international tax competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
International Tax Competition and Coordination
This paper aims to provide a comprehensive survey of the theory of international tax competition. Starting with the standard framework, it visits the non-cooperative equilibrium of tax competition, analyses aspects of partial and regional coordination, repeated interaction, stock-flow-effects, agglomeration effects and time consistency issues in dynamic models. We discuss profit shifting in the...
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The historical evolution of the corporate tax burden in the OECD nations is studied, beginning with an assessment of alternative measures of the burden. Descriptive analysis of these time series reveals no evidence of a competitive “race to the bottom” in capital taxation, and little evidence of even a harmonization of the tax burden. These conclusions for the OECD and Europe as a whole are con...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.005