Debt to Equity Ratio dan Suku Bunga Terhadap Harga Saham
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Debt, Equity and Warrants
This paper considers project financing under adverse selection and moral hazard and makes three contributions. First, the issue of combinations of debt and equity is explained as the outcome of the interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard. Second, it shows that, in the presence of moral hazard, adverse selection may result in the conversion of negative into positive NPV projects l...
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The model presented in this paper is a particular case of the principal-agent problem. An entrepreneur has an investment project whose returns depend on his effort, which is not observable by the financier. After determining the optimal contract that is used to finance such a project, I show that this contract can be replicated by a unique combination of debt and equity, which proves the op tim...
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Mehra and Prescott (1985) found the difference between average equity and debt returns puzzling because it was too large to be a premium for bearing nondiversifiable aggregate risk. Here, we re-examine this puzzle, taking into account some factors ignored by Mehra and Prescott–taxes, regulatory constraints, and diversification costs–and focusing on long-term rather than short-term savings instr...
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Government guarantees of private debt deplete equity. The depletion is greatest during periods when the probability of a guarantee payoff is highest. In a setting otherwise subject to Modigliani-Miller neutrality, firms issue guaranteed debt up to the limit the government permits. Declines in asset values raise debt in relation to asset values and thus deplete equity directly, under the realist...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Manager : Jurnal Ilmu manajemen
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2655-0008,2654-8623
DOI: 10.32832/manager.v1i1.1433