Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Affiliated bankers on board and conservative accounting
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal Of Network Theory In Finance
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2055-7795
DOI: 10.21314/jntf.2018.038