Davidson and Rorty on truth

Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology

We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particula...

The Indefinability of Truth and Interpretation in Heidegger and Davidson

starting points that lead to ‘the true’ but are not themselves genuine or authentic. For Heidegger, once we reflect on their inadequacies and recognize their function in everyday practice, they have no further role to play in philosophical reflection. Indeed, once we reach this point, reliance upon the everyday senses of truth becomes a barrier to reflection. We dispense with truth as correctne...

Theories Of Meaning And Logical Truth: Edwards Versus Davidson

A truth definition does not distinguish between analytic sentences and others, except for sentences that owe their truth to the presence alone of the constants that give the theory its grip on structure: the theory entails not only that these sentences are true but that they will remain true under all significant rewritings of their non-logical parts. A notion of logical truth is thus given lim...

study of some epistemological and political consequences of rorty and gadamer's doctrines on truth

in this article, the author deals with the critical study of rorty and gadamer's doctrines on truth through analyzing its undesirable epistemological and political consequences. rorty denies truth and believes that it is merely the indicator of sentences specification. but gadamer does not deny truth and believes it is as event of appearance which flourishes from within the dialogue and ma...

Rorty and His Critics