Cycles and multiple equilibria in the market for durable lemons
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cycles and Multiple Equilibria in the Market for Durable Lemons
We investigate the nature of market failure in a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) where identical cohorts of a durable good enter the market over time. In the dynamic model, equilibria with qualitatively different properties emerge. Typically, in equilibria of the dynamic model, sellers with higher quality wait in order to sell and wait more than sellers of lower quality. Among other things, w...
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15 صفحه اولInformation and the market for lemons
This article revisits Akerlof’s (1970) classic adverse-selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Better information on the selling side worsens the “buyer’s curse,” thus lowering demand, but may shift supply as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on the relative sizes o...
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In a durable good market where sellers have private information about quality, I identify certain problems in dynamic trading and sorting that arise in the presence of heterogeneity among buyers. Higher valuation buyers may have have lower incentive to wait to buy better quality at a later time period. As a result, even though higher quality sellers may wait to sell later at higher prices and d...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-001-0236-9