منابع مشابه
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on both the actual and the optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become inferior when some agents value fairness. Conversely, implicit bonus contracts that are doomed to fail among purely selfish actors provide powerful incenti...
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This paper studies the structure of state-contingent contracts in the presence of moral hazard and multitasking. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of multitasking to lead to fixed payments instead of incentive schemes are identified. It is shown that the primary determinant of whether multitasking leads to higher or lower powered incentives is the role that noncontractible ou...
متن کاملRobust Incentives and Non-Exclusive Contracts
This paper studies a moral hazard problem in which the agent can borrow on future wages before undertaking a costly e¤ort. The game between the agent and potential lenders is modelled as an in nite stochastic game with an exogenous stopping probability. It is shown that regardless of the initial wage contract the agent sequentially enters into multiple borrowing agreements which dilute e¤ort in...
متن کاملQuality Improvement Incentives and Product Recall Cost Sharing Contracts
A companies outsource more product design and manufacturing activities to other members of the supply chain, improving end-product quality has become an endeavor extending beyond the boundaries of the firms’ in-house process capabilities. In this paper, we discuss two contractual agreements by which product recall costs can be shared between a manufacturer and a supplier to induce quality impro...
متن کاملOn relative performance contracts and fund manager’s incentives
For pension schemes, mutual funds, banks and other financial intermediaries, large portfolio decisions are increasingly delegated to fund managers. Recently, there has been growing concern that these managers seem to adopt extremely similar investment strategies. One possible explanation for this phenomenon may be found in reward schemes based on relative performance. We show how relative perfo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Journal of Agricultural Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0002-9092,1467-8276
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8276.2009.01322.x