Customization with Vertically Differentiated Products
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Customization with Vertically Differentiated Products
We consider a duopoly market with heterogeneous consumers. The firms initially produce vertically differentiated standard products located at the end points of the variety interval. Customization provides ideal varieties for consumers but has no effect on quality. The firms first choose whether to customize their products, then engage in price competition. We show that the low-quality firm neve...
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This paper studies the seller’s optimal pricing policies for a family of substitute perishable products. The seller aims to maximize her expected cumulative revenues over a finite selling horizon. At each demand epoch, the arriving customer observes the set of substitute products with positive inventory together with their prices. Based on this information as well as the customer’s own budget c...
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We describe research on a supply chain contracting problem that was sponsored by a major semi-conductor manufacturer. The manufacturer sells products (semiconductor parts) with varying quality levels through a network of distributors to end consumers (independent computer shops, system configurators, hobbyists, etc.) who have heterogeneous valuations for quality. Since production costs for semi...
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We consider a seller who owns two capacity constrained resources and markets two products (components) corresponding to these resources as well as a bundle comprising the two components. In an environment where all customers agree that one of the two components is of higher quality than the other and that the bundle is of the highest quality, we derive the seller’s optimal bundling strategy. We...
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We develop a location model of price discrimination in many-to-many matching markets in which agents’ preferences are both vertically and horizontally differentiated. The optimal plans induce negative assortative matching at the margin: at any given location, agents with a low value for interacting with agents from the opposite side (the vertical dimension) are included in the matching sets of ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1058-6407
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00295.x