Cumulative Cyber Deterrence

Deterrence, Influence, Cyber Attack, and Cyberwar

* Paul K. Davis is a senior principal researcher at the RAND Corporation and a professor of policy analysis in the Pardee RAND Graduate School. His early studies were in the hard sciences and he received a Ph.D. in theoretical chemical physics at M.I.T. After working on strategic technology and systems analysis at the Institute for Defense Analyses, he joined the U.S. government to work on stra...

Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism

I n early 2003 an Israeli agent in the Gaza Strip telephoned Mustafa, a wealthy Palestinian merchant in Gaza, to inform him that over the previous three months his son Ahmad had been preparing for a suicide bombing mission in Israel. Mustafa was told that if his son followed through with his plans, he and his family would suffer severe consequences: their home would be demolished, and Israel wo...

Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence

Alternatives to Cyber Warfare: Deterrence and Assurance

Deterrence as practiced during the Cold War was largely defined in terms of capabilities to impose punishment in response to an attack; however, with growing concern over the proliferation of cyber technologies, deterrence has evolved to be understood more generally in terms of cost/benefit calculi, viewed from not only a national perspective, but also recognizing the importance of both friendl...

Deterrence of Cyber Attacks and U.S. National Security

This paper draws on deterrence theory to analyze the challenges that the United States faces in deterring cyber attacks. We begin by briefly reviewing the basic logic of deterrence theory and relating it to the challenge posed by cyber attacks. The following section explores what is commonly viewed as the key problem in deterring cyber attacks—the “attribution problem” arises when a state canno...