Cryptographic implications of Hess' generalized GHS attack
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The GHS Attack Revisited
We generalize the Weil descent construction of the GHS attack to arbitrary Artin-Schreier extensions. We give a formula for the characteristic polynomial of Frobenius of the obtained curves and prove that the large cyclic factor of the input elliptic curve is not contained in the kernel of the composition of the conorm and norm maps. As an application we almost square the number of elliptic cur...
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The Weil descent attack, suggested by Frey, has been implemented by Gaudry, Hess and Smart (the so-called GHS attack), on elliptic curves over finite fields of characteristic two of composite degrees. The GHS attack has been extended by Galbraith to hyperelliptic curves of characteristic two. Recently, Diem presented a general treatment of GHS attack to hyperelliptic curves over finite fields o...
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This paper give a generalization of the GHS attack which is a class of attacks for algebraic curve cryptography, proposed by Pierrick Gaudry, Florian Hess and Nigel P. Smart [GHS]. In the mid of 1980’s, Victor Miller and Neal Koblitz independently proposed elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) which designates the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in the finite group Fq-rational points of an ellipti...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Applicable Algebra in Engineering, Communication and Computing
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0938-1279,1432-0622
DOI: 10.1007/s00200-005-0186-8