Crowding-out voluntary contributions to public goods
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Modeling Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
This paper addresses four stylized facts that summarize data from experimental studies of voluntary contributions to provision of public goods. Theoretical propositions and testable hypotheses for voluntary contributions are derived from two models of social preferences, the inequity aversion model and the egocentric other-regarding preferences model. We nd that the egocentric other-regardin...
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This paper studies multi-stage processes of non-cooperative voluntary provision of public goods. In the first stage, one or more players announce contributions that may be conditional on the subsequent contributions of others. In later stages, players choose their own contributions and fulfill any commitments made in the first stage. Equilibrium contributions are characterized under different a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00232-3