منابع مشابه
Crowding games are sequentially solvable
A sequential-move version of a given normal-form game Γ is an extensive-form game of perfect information in which each player chooses his action after observing the actions of all players who precede him and the payoffs are determined according to the payoff functions in Γ. A normal-form game Γ is sequentially solvable if each of its sequential-move versions has a subgame-perfect equilibrium in...
متن کاملWhen are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of plurality rule voting games. For any number of alternatives and at least four voters, we find sufficient conditions for the game to be dominance-solvable (DS) and not to be DS. These conditions can be stated in terms of only one aspect of the game, the largest proportion of voters who agree on ...
متن کاملfinite bci-groups are solvable
let $s$ be a subset of a finite group $g$. the bi-cayley graph ${rm bcay}(g,s)$ of $g$ with respect to $s$ is an undirected graph with vertex set $gtimes{1,2}$ and edge set ${{(x,1),(sx,2)}mid xin g, sin s}$. a bi-cayley graph ${rm bcay}(g,s)$ is called a bci-graph if for any bi-cayley graph ${rm bcay}(g,t)$, whenever ${rm bcay}(g,s)cong {rm bcay}(g,t)$ we have $t=gs^alpha$ for some $...
متن کاملExtrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance Solvable Games
We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching which is either a game solvable through iterated elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS), a pure Co...
متن کاملDominance Solvable Games with Multiple Payoff Criteria
Two logically distinct and permissive extensions of iterative weak dominance are introduced for games with possibly vector-valued payoffs. The first, iterative partial dominance, builds on an easy-tocheck condition but may lead to solutions that do not include any (generalized) Nash equilibria. However, the second and intuitively more demanding extension, iterative essential dominance, is shown...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050086