Cross-Border Central Bank Digital Currencies, Bank Runs and Capital Flows Volatility
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cross - Border Bank Flows and Systemic Risk
We examine the impact of cross-border bank flows on recipient countries’ systemic risk. Using data on bank flows from 26 source countries to 119 recipient countries, we find that bank flows are associated with improved financial stability (i.e. lower systemic risk) in the recipient country. The impact of bank flows is stronger in recipient countries with weak regulatory quality and fragile bank...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IMF working paper
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1018-5941', '2227-8885']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400209185.001