منابع مشابه
Computing Pareto Optimal Committees
Selecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an important problem in committee selection and beyond. Among the various criteria put forth for desirability of a committee, Pareto optimality is a minimal and important requirement. As asking agents to specify their preferences over exponentially many subsets of alternatives is practically infeasible, we assume that each ag...
متن کاملUse of Pareto-Optimal and Near Pareto-Optimal Candidate Rules in Genetic Fuzzy Rule Selection
Genetic fuzzy rule selection is an effective approach to the design of accurate and interpretable fuzzy rule-based classifiers. It tries to minimize the complexity of fuzzy rule-based classifiers while maximizing their accuracy by selecting only a small number of fuzzy rules from a large number of candidate rules. One important issue in genetic fuzzy rule selection is the prescreening of candid...
متن کاملUsing Pareto Optimal Choice Sets
In behavioral experiments the respondents make their choices based on several factors called attributes. When the attributes are related to benefits and costs and respondents choose one attribute at a time, the highest level for benefit attributes and the lowest level for cost attributes will be selected. The relative importance given by the respondents to the attributes is not determined. If a...
متن کاملPareto Optimal Coordination on Roadmaps
Given a collection of robots sharing a common environment, assume that each possesses an individual roadmap for its C-space and a cost function for attaining a goal. Vector-valued (or Pareto) optima for collision-free coordination are by no means unique: in fact, continua of optimal coordinations are possible. However, for cylindrical obstacles (those defined by pairwise interactions), we prove...
متن کاملPareto Optimal Budgeted Combinatorial Auctions
This paper studies the possibility of implementing Pareto optimal outcomes in the combinatorial auction setting where bidders may have budget constraints. I show that when the setting involves a single good, or multiple goods but with single-minded bidders, there is a unique mechanism, called truncation VCG, that is individually rational, incentive compatible and Pareto optimal. Truncation VCG ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Entropy
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1099-4300
DOI: 10.3390/e22020165