Crisis Poison Pills*

Inoculating Relevance Feedback Against Poison Pills

Poison Pills, Optimal Contracting and the Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from Fortune 500 Firms

The rationale for issuing poison pill securities remains unclear, despite the findings of a large body of prior research that these defenses adversely affect shareholder wealth. This paper investigates the hypothesis that the adoption of such defenses may reflect shareholders’ desire to contract efficiently with their managers in an environment characterized by hostile takeovers and uncertainty...

On the Use of Poison Pills and Defensive Payouts by Takeover Targets*

On August 4, 1998, Allied Signal announced a $44.50 per share unsolicited takeover offer for AMP Incorporated. Upon the announcement, the stock price of AMP increased by 49%, from $28.625 to $42.5625. AMP’s management, armed with a poison pill plan and Pennsylvania antitakeover statutes, rejected the buyout offer. However, over the following few weeks, 72% of AMP’s shareholders chose to tender ...

DIFFUSION IN ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills

There has been rapid growth in the study of diffusion across organizations and social movements in recent years, fueled by interest in institutional arguments and in network and dynamic analysis. This research develops a sociologically grounded account of change emphasizing the channels along which practices flow. Our review focuses on characteristic lines of argument, emphasizing the structura...

The Reputational Impact of Corporate Governance: the Case of Poison Pills