CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATE SHAREHOLDERS
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Corporate Criminal Liability
The Common Law: Vicarious Liability and the Development of Primary Liability UNLESS THE TERMS OF THE STATUTE INVOLVED SPECIFICALLY PROVIDE TO the contrary, the criminal responsibility of a company or corporation, as distinct from its officers or employees, falls to be determined by common law principles. Under original common law, a company could not be convicted for any criminal offence. The c...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Law, Government and Communication
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0128-1763
DOI: 10.35631/ijlgc.520004