Creditor protection, judicial enforcement and credit access
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Creditor Rights, Enforcement and the Access to Credit
A large and growing literature has demonstrated in recent years how deep and efficient financial markets help to foster economic growth, by promoting investment and productivity growth (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Through their role in selecting and monitoring projects, diversifying risks, and allowing investment and production to be carried out in the most productive scale and time frame,...
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The cost of enforcing contracts is a key determinant of market performance. We document this point with reference to the credit market. We start by presenting a model of opportunistic debtors and inefficient courts. According to the model, improvements in judicial efficiency reduce credit rationing and increase lending, while have an ambiguous effect on interest rates, depending on banking comp...
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Can the President refuse to enforce a law he deems unconstitutional? Take the Affordable Care Act. The Supreme Court upheld the provision in the Act mandating that individuals purchase health insurance, but leading Republicans continue to press the view that the law is unconstitutional. Suppose one such Republican captures the presidency in 2016. His first act in office is to recommend legislat...
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The effectiveness of any law largely depends on the clarity of legal provisions and the activity of their enforcement institutions. Securities law, which is inherently complex, must be unambiguous to be properly applied. Judges and lawyers dealing with securities litigation need to be trained properly to provide justice for the public. Laws governing initial public offerings in Bangladesh are a...
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The empty creditor problem arises when a debtholder has obtained insurance against default but otherwise retains control rights in and outside bankruptcy. We analyze this problem from an ex ante and ex post perspective in a formal model of debt with limited commitment, by comparing contracting outcomes with and without insurance through credit default swaps (CDS). We show that CDS, and the empt...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The European Journal of Finance
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1351-847X,1466-4364
DOI: 10.1080/1351847x.2016.1216871