Creditor Coordination, Liquidation Timing, and Debt Valuation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Creditor Rights and Corporate Debt Structure∗
Much of our understanding of creditor rights is based on the notion that better enforcement of contracts reduces borrowing costs, thereby relaxing financial constraints. But what if these rights are too strong? We empirically investigate this question by examining the effect of a securitization reform that strengthened secured creditors rights on corporate debt structure. Strikingly, we find th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0022-1090,1756-6916
DOI: 10.1017/s0022109011000330