Creditor control rights and firm investment policy☆
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Data Appendix for Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value*
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0304-405X
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.04.008