منابع مشابه
The Optimal Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) very often have been criticized for announcing inaccurate credit ratings and are suspected of being exposed to conicts of interest. Despite these objections CRAs remained largely unregulated. Based on Pagano & Immordino (2007), we study the optimal regulation of CRAs in a model where rating quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The model show...
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In this paper we show that public reserves with a low return and a partial creditguarantee scheme can be optimal if banks face a moral hazard problem with both hidden actions and hidden information. In our model, banks face uncertain returns on their loans or investments, and both the level of investment and the actual returns are unobservable to anyone but the bank itself. We formulate the pro...
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Both auditors and credit rating agencies have been linked to financial scandals in recent history. In the early 2000’s, several of the “big five” accounting firms issued favorable audit opinions to public companies employing deceptive accounting practices. Some of these companies even committed outright fraud. Once the investing public caught wind of these accounting irregularities, it lost tru...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Panoeconomicus
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1452-595X,2217-2386
DOI: 10.2298/pan1102219b