Credit Limit of Unsecured Consumer Lending: Evidence from Micro Data
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competitive Poaching in Unsecured Lending∗
The paper studies the effects of non-exclusivity of credit card contracts on the provision of insurance through the institution of personal bankruptcy. In our model, lenders can continually observe borrower’s time-varying creditworthiness and provide credit to them by undercutting (poaching) the existing lender(s). Contracts are non-exclusive and, to rollover their debt, borrowers may accept mu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics and Finance in Indonesia
سال: 2021
ISSN: 2442-9260,0126-155X
DOI: 10.47291/efi.v67i1.697