Credible enticements

Credible implementation

The theory of implementation abounds with mechanisms with intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it is not in the designer’s best interest to go through with the reward/punishment in the “subgame” arising from some disequilibrium play. This would make the mechanism’s outcome function non-credible. We define a notion of credible implementation and, in t...

Credible Ratings

This paper considers a model of a rating agency with multiple clients, in which each client has a separate market that forms a belief about the quality of the client after the agency issues a rating. When the clients are rated separately (individual rating), the credibility of a good rating is limited by the incentive of the agency to exaggerate the quality of its client. In centralized rating,...

Credible Compilation

This paper presents an approach to compiler correctness in which the compiler generates a proof that the transformed program correctly implements the input program. A simple proof checker can then verify that the program was compiled correctly. We call a compiler that produces such proofs a credible compiler, because it produces veri able evidence that it is operating correctly.

Learning to be Credible

Rethinking credible evidence synthesis.

Government regulators and systematic reviewers both aim to generate an accurate understanding of the effects of interventions. However, the methods they use, and the evidence they consider, are different. Although both focus on randomised clinical trials for determining safety and efficacy, the mostly academic community of systematic reviewers generally get their data from published reports of ...