منابع مشابه
Credible Coalitions and the Core 1
; A problem with the concept of the core is that it does not explicitly capture the credibility of blocking coalitions, This notion is defined, and the concept of a modified core introduced, consisting of allocations not blocked by any credible coalition. The core and modified core are then shown to be identical. The concept of credibility is thus implicit in the definition of the core. Conside...
متن کاملOn core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
Article history: Received 17 July 2008 Available online 27 January 2009 JEL classification: C71
متن کاملCommunication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information
We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then de®ne a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core, which requires credibility from the improvements is introduced.
متن کاملCredible implementation
The theory of implementation abounds with mechanisms with intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it is not in the designer’s best interest to go through with the reward/punishment in the “subgame” arising from some disequilibrium play. This would make the mechanism’s outcome function non-credible. We define a notion of credible implementation and, in t...
متن کاملComplexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among selfinterested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can accomplish them more efficiently. Motivating the agents to abide by a solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of a...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 1989
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/bf01268157