Cracking the whip: spatial voting with party discipline and voter polarization

Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation

I study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous...

Shape of a cracking whip.

The crack of a whip is produced by a shock wave created by the supersonic motion of the tip of the whip in the air. A simple dynamical model for the propagation and acceleration of waves in the motion of whips is presented. The respective contributions of tension, tapering, and boundary conditions in the acceleration of an initial impulse are studied theoretically and numerically.

Cracking the Whip to Make Gasoline

Double voter perceptible blind signature based electronic voting protocol

Mu et al. have proposed an electronic voting protocol and claimed that it protects anonymity of voters, detects double voting and authenticates eligible voters. It has been shown that it does not protect voter's privacy and prevent double voting. After that, several schemes have been presented to fulfill these properties. However, many of them suffer from the same weaknesses. In this p...

Party Cohesion, Party Factions and Legislative Party Discipline in Italy

Moving beyond a unitary actor assumption that models members of a self-evidently collective entity such as a political party “as if” they all shared a single brain, this paper explores the cohesion and discipline of party legislators in multi-party systems operating under the constitutional rules of parliamentary government. We do this in the context of Italian politics, for which a consistent ...