منابع مشابه
The Politics of Consumption Taxes: Globalization and the Median Voter
The regressive nature of consumption taxes poses a challenge to partisan theory. Using data for up to 20 OECD countries in the period 1970-2003 this article aims to explore the question of whether the idea that social democratic governments typically have to compromise on policy goals and core constituency interests to make themselves more appealing to the median voter necessitates the use of r...
متن کاملBargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
We provide strong game-theoretic foundations for the median voter theorem in a onedimensional bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) model of distributive politics. We prove that, as the agents become arbitrarily patient, the set of proposals that can be passed in any subgame perfect equilibrium collapses to the median voter’s ideal point. While we leave the possibility of some d...
متن کاملEvaluating the Median Voter Model’s Explanatory Power
We match individual senators’ voting behavior on legislative proposals with 24 real referenda decisions on exactly the same issues with identical wording. This setting allows us to evaluate the median voter model’s quality with revealed constituents’ preferences. Results indicate a limited explanatory power of the median voter model: It explains 17.6 percentage points more than random voting an...
متن کاملthe politics of consumption taxes: globalization and the median voter
the regressive nature of consumption taxes poses a challenge to partisan theory. using data for up to 20 oecd countries in the period 1970-2003 this article aims to explore the question of whether the idea that social democratic governments typically have to compromise on policy goals and core constituency interests to make themselves more appealing to the median voter necessitates the use of r...
متن کاملMedian-voter Equilibria in the Neoclassical Growth Model under Aggregation
We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard’s median-voter model where agents differ in initial wealth. Taxes are proportional to total income, and they are redistributed as equal lumpsum transfers. Voting takes place every period and each consumer votes for the current tax rate that maximizes his or her welfare. We characterize time-consistent (differentiable) Markovperfect equilibria in...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Review of Politics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2374-779X,2374-7781
DOI: 10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2013.34.0.65-84