Covenant violations and dynamic loan contracting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Corporate Finance
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0929-1199
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.05.009