منابع مشابه
Information and Relational Contracts
We investigate the use of information in repeated principal-agent game and report three results. First, consistent with Kandori (1992), garbling signals within each period hurts the e¢ ciency of the game. Second, contrary to Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), bundling signals across periods and then fully revealing them never increases the e¢ ciency of the game. Third, and most importantly, we ...
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We consider a model in which a principal must both repay a loan and motivate an agent to work hard. Output is non-contractible, so the principal faces a commitment problem with both her creditor and her agent. In a profit-maximizing equilibrium, the agent’s productivity is initially low and increases over time. Productivity continues increasing even after the debt has been repaid, eventually co...
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Empirical studies of commercial relationships between firms reveal that (i) suppliers encounter situations in which they can gain in the short run by acting opportunistically—for example, delivering a lower quality than promised after being paid; and (ii) good conduct is sustained not exclusively by formal contracts but through informal relationships and the expectation of future business. In s...
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A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly—particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt them and a well developed understanding of how they work— remains incomplete. In this paper we suggest that competitively signifi...
متن کاملRelational Contracts and Job Design
This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal alwa...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1465-7341
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/18.1.221