Cournot and Bertrand Competition in the Software Industry
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Research International
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2090-2123,2090-2131
DOI: 10.1155/2017/9752520