منابع مشابه
Information acquisition and mutual funds
We generalize the standard competitive rational expectations equilibrium (Hellwig (1980), Verrecchia (1982)) by studying the possibility that informed agents open mutual funds in order to sell their private information. We illustrate how mutual funds endogenously arise in equilibrium and we characterize the fund managers’ optimal investment management fees under imperfect competition. In our mo...
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The performance of country exchange-traded funds and closed-end funds is investigated over the 2002 to 2011 period. Operating characteristics (i.e., expense ratios and portfolio turnover) and investment results (i.e., return, risk, and risk-adjusted return) are studied for investment funds with at least ten years of data. We find that although exchange-traded funds have significantly lower expe...
متن کاملAsymmetric Information and Rationalizability
We study how asymmetric information affects the set of rationalizable solutions in a linear setup where the outcome is determined by forecasts about this same outcome. The unique rational expectations equilibrium is also the unique rationalizable solution when the sensitivity of the outcome to agents’ forecasts is less than one, provided that this sensitivity is common knowledge. Relaxing this ...
متن کاملAmbiguity and Asymmetric Information
The theoretical literature has found that advantageous selection could be observed in equilibrium when there is multi-dimensional heterogeneity of customers or both hidden action and hidden information are employed. This paper proposes a third approach for advantageous selection. Based on the classic Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model, we consider ambiguity-averse individuals who face a gener...
متن کاملExternalities and Asymmetric Information*
A reconsideration of the Pigovian theory of regulating externalities via taxation is undertaken for environments with private information. The presence of private information may have no effect on the social optimum; but when it has an impact, it is to cause a group of different agents to share the same production or consumption levels. The model developed provides an appealing characterization...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Finance & Economics
سال: 2000
ISSN: 1076-9307,1099-1158
DOI: 10.1002/1099-1158(200007)5:3<177::aid-ijfe131>3.0.co;2-d