Counter Closure and Knowledge Despite Falsehood

Counter Closure and Knowledge despite Falsehood

Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in quest...

Closure, Counter-Closure, and Inferential Knowledge

The first thing to note about these principles is that (as I will be understanding them), they are not merely classificatory principles for demarcating/separating cases of knowledge from non-knowledge. As I will be understanding (and using) them, (C) and (CC) are intended to be featured in epistemological explanations of why some agent S knows that Q (as opposed, e.g., to merely truly believing...

Dretske on Knowledge Closure

Consumer knowledge of over-the-counter phenazopyridine.

BACKGROUND Effective use of over-the-counter (OTC) medications depends on purchasers' knowledge of their indications. This study examines consumer knowledge regarding the urinary tract analgesic phenazopyridine, which recently became available without prescription. METHOD We conducted a cross-sectional survey of a stratified cluster random sample of purchasers of OTC phenazopyridine (N = 434)...

A Theory of Truth that Prefers Falsehood

We introduce a subclass of Kripke’s fixed points in which falsehood is the preferred truth value. In all of these the truthteller evaluates to false, while the liar evaluates to undefined (or overdefined). The mathematical structure of this family of fixed points is investigated and is shown to have many nice features. It is noted that a similar class of fixed points, preferring truth, can also...