Could vote buying be socially desirable? Exploratory analyses of a ‘failed’ list experiment

Abstract List experiments encourage survey respondents to report sensitive opinions they may prefer not reveal. But, studies sometimes find that admit more readily when asked directly. Often this over-reporting is viewed as a design failure, attributable inattentiveness or other nonstrategic error. This paper conducts an exploratory analysis of such ‘failed’ list experiment measuring vote buying in the 2019 Nigerian presidential election. We take opportunity explore our assumptions about buying. Although illegal and stigmatized many countries, significant literature links exchanges patron-client networks are imbued with trust, reciprocity long-standing benefits, which might create incentives for individuals claim having been offered participate Submitting data series tests design, we strategic: intentionally reveal it’s likely those who have fact being Considering reasons social desirability network strategic nature over-reporting, suggest “design failure" only possible conclusion from unexpected results. With show theoretical sensitivity bias affect conclusions can draw experiment.