Costs of implementation: Bargaining costs versus allocative efficiency
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Costs of Implementation: Bargaining Costs versus Allocative Efficiency
Christian Zehnder, and workshop participants at MIT and Harvard are gratefully acknowledged. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies. 2 A mechanism with low direct cost of use may be preferred to alternatives implementing more efficient allocations. We show this experimentally by giving pairs of subjects the option to agree on a single average price for a sequence of trades – in effect pooling ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.11.004