Costly signaling in autocracy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Interactions
سال: 2021
ISSN: 0305-0629,1547-7444
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1898956