منابع مشابه
Conflict, sticks and carrots: war increases prosocial punishments and rewards.
Unlike most species, humans cooperate extensively with group members who are not closely related to them, a pattern sustained in part by punishing non-cooperators and rewarding cooperators. Because internally cooperative groups prevail over less cooperative rival groups, it is thought that violent intergroup conflict played a key role in the evolution of human cooperation. Consequently, it is p...
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Teaching with evaluative feedback involves expectations about how a learner will interpret rewards and punishments. We formalize two hypotheses of how a teacher implicitly expects a learner to interpret feedback – a reward-maximizing model based on standard reinforcement learning and an action-feedback model based on research on communicative intent – and describe a virtual animal-training task...
متن کاملThe Influence of Divine Rewards and Punishments on Religious Prosociality
A common finding across many cultures has been that religious people behave more prosocially than less (or non-) religious people. Numerous priming studies have demonstrated that the activation of religious concepts via implicit and explicit cues (e.g., 'God,' 'salvation,' among many others) increases prosociality in religious people. However, the factors underlying such findings are less clear...
متن کاملThe Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation
Many institutional arrangements suggest that punishments and rewards each play a separate role in providing incentives. In New York City’s recent negotiations with its teacher’s union, for instance, the city sought a contract that would strengthen school principals’ ability to assign teachers to be cafeteria monitors, in part because this allows them to punish underperforming teachers. The cont...
متن کاملMechanism Design with Costly Verification and Limited Punishments∗
A principal has to allocate a good among a number of agents, each of whom values the good. Each agent has private information about the principal’s payoff if he receives the good. There are no monetary transfers. The principal can inspect agents’ reports at a cost and penalize them, but the punishments are limited. I characterize an optimal mechanism featuring two thresholds. Agents whose value...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1935-1704,2194-6124
DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2018-0131