Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default

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چکیده

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Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory

سال: 2015

ISSN: 0022-0531

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.011