منابع مشابه
Costly Acquisition of (Differentiated) Information
Consumers' choices among many different types of information sub-a-fields are examined in a large, perfectly competitive pure exchange economy in which information serves as a consumption good as well as a device to aid in the maximization of state-dependent utility. Analysis of derived preferences over information and wealth (and the resulting value of information function) implies that indivi...
متن کاملAuction Equilibrium with Costly Information Acquisition
This paper presents a simple model of auction equilibrium. The distinctive feature of the model is that each bidder may discover the value that the item represents for herself, provided she spends some amount in order to be well informed. For each agent, the decision of whether or not to acquire information depends on a private cost of information acquisition and on her conjectures regarding th...
متن کاملOptimal Contracts with Costly Information Acquisition
This paper analyzes a dynamic moral-hazard model where a principal searches for an opportunity of uncertain return, and hires an agent to evaluate potential options that arrive stochastically over time. The agent’s effort affects the informativeness of a signal about an option’s return. Based on the information provided by the agent, the principal decides whether or not to exercise an option at...
متن کاملEthical Voters and Costly Information Acquisition∗
Game theoretic and statistical models have emphasized the desirable information aggregation properties of large elections. However, such models do not explain why voters choose to acquire costly information. In this paper we use an ethical voter model to endogenize the decision to acquire information. We show that a significant fraction of the electorate will acquire costly information. However...
متن کاملOptimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
A group of individuals with identical preferences must make a decision under uncertainty about which decision is best. Before the decision is made, each agent can privately acquire a costly and imperfect signal. We discuss how to design a mechanism for eliciting and aggregating the collected information so as to maximize ex-ante social welfare. We first show that, of all mechanisms, a sequentia...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104979