منابع مشابه
Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation
We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly, even when there are equilibria in which an agreement is reached, we find that the model always has an e...
متن کاملThe Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation
We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete, but unverifiable information, using the mechanism-design approach. We show how renegotiation activity is best modeled in the fundamentals of the mechanism-design framework, so that noncontractibility of renegotiation amounts to a constraint on the problem. We formalize and clarify the Renegotiation-Proofness Principle (RPP),...
متن کاملDelegated Bargaining and Renegotiation
This paper examines the commitment e ect of delegated bargaining when renegotiation of the delegation contract cannot be ruled out. We consider a seller who can either bargain face-to-face with a prospective buyer or hire an intermediary to bargain on her behalf. The intermediary is able to interrupt his negotiation with the buyer to renegotiate the delegation contract. In this model, the time ...
متن کاملCostly Signaling and Crisis Bargaining
The sequence of moves are as follows. First nature informs both defender and challenger of their values for the issue in question, vD and vD. vD and vC are drawn from the distribution function FD(v) and FC(v). Second, the defender chooses a signal m ≥ 0, which is observed by the challenger. Third, the challenger chooses whether to challenge; if challenger does not challenge, the game ends. Four...
متن کاملCostly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security
This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0012-9682,1468-0262
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00196