Cost sharing exemptions

The Cost of Regulatory Exemptions

Cost Sharing

The objective of cooperative game theory is to study ways to enforce and sustain cooperation among agents willing to cooperate. A central question in this field is how the benefits (or costs) of a joint effort can be divided among participants, taking into account individual and group incentives, as well as various fairness properties. In this chapter, we define basic concepts and review some o...

Simple Cost-Sharing Contracts

Economic guidance can be of substantial value to policymakers in principle. However, guidance delivered in the form of complex formulae and detailed mathematical characterizations of optimal policies may not be fully appreciated or warmly embraced. Consequently, insights like those of William Rogerson (2003) are particularly important. Rogerson demonstrates in a plausible setting that a pair of...

Statistical Cost Sharing

We study the cost sharing problem for cooperative games in situations where the cost function C is not available via oracle queries, but must instead be learned from samples drawn from a distribution, represented as tuples (S,C(S)), for different subsets S of players. We formalize this approach, which we call STATISTICAL COST SHARING, and consider the computation of the core and the Shapley val...

Mixed serial cost sharing

A new serial cost sharing rule, called mixed serial cost sharing, is defined on the class of cost functions which equal a sum of an increasing convex and increasing concave function. This rule is based on a particular decomposition principle known as complementary-slackness decomposition and it coincides with the original serial rule of Moulin and Shenker (1992) [Moulin, H., Shenker, S., 1992. ...