منابع مشابه
Cost Pass-through under Delegation
The rate of cost pass-through exceeds 50% under strategic delegation of decision-making to managers with sales revenue contracts regardless of the number of rms in the industry and demand curvature. This contrasts sharply with pro t-maximization, for which cost pass-through can take on any positive value. The key intuition is that rms under delegation act as if they faced more rivals than th...
متن کاملIncomplete cost pass-through under deep habits
Article history: Received 25 November 2008 Revised 23 May 2009 Available online 11 June 2009 JEL classification: D1 D4 L1
متن کاملStrategic delegation under cost asymmetry
We revisit the two-stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and asymmetric technologies of Sen and Stamatopoulos (2015). We show that their conclusions are misled by the restrictive assumption that the extent of delegation to managers is restricted to a binary set. Allowing for a continuous set of delegation incentives, we prove that the delegation stage is a prisonersdilemma, the unique s...
متن کاملNber Working Paper Series Incomplete Cost Pass-through under Deep Habits
A number of empirical studies document that marginal cost shocks are not fully passed through to prices at the firm level and that prices are substantially less volatile than costs. We show that in the relative-deep-habits model of Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006), firm-specific marginal cost shocks are not fully passed through to product prices. That is, in response to a firm-specific inc...
متن کاملThe Simple Economics of Asymmetric Cost Pass-Through
In response to cost changes, prices often rise more strongly or quickly than they fall. This phenomenon has attracted attention from economists, policymakers, and the general public for decades. Many assert that it cannot be explained by standard economic theory, and is evidence for “anti-competitive” behaviour by firms. This paper argues against this conventional wisdom; it shows that simple p...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1935-1704,2194-6124
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1383