Cost-Balancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Marginal cost pricing for Atomic Network Congestion Games
We study optimal tolls for network congestion games where players aim to route certain amount of traffic between various source destination pairs. We consider weighted atomic users, unsplittable traffic and arbitrary nondecreasing latency functions. Users are selfish and want to follow routes that minimize their respective latencies. We focus on pure Nash equilibria. A Nash equilibrium profile ...
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An effective means to reduce the inefficiency of Nash flows in nonatomic network routing games is to impose tolls on the arcs of the network. It is a well-known fact that marginal cost tolls induce a Nash flow that corresponds to a minimum cost flow. However, despite their effectiveness, marginal cost tolls suffer from two major drawbacks, namely (i) that potentially every arc of the network is...
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The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert market power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion tolls. When large agents are confronted with tolls derived under this parametric assumption but under...
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We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that computes a pure Nash equilibrium with respect to traffic congestion in a network. In this algorithm each user plays only once and allocates her traffic to a path selected via a shortest path computation. We then show that th...
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We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We give a precise description of the dynamics induced by the individual strategies of players and of the corresponding costs, either when the traffic is control...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Internet Mathematics
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1542-7951,1944-9488
DOI: 10.1080/15427951.2008.10129175