Corruption as Collateral

Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation

We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game : Principal, Agent, Corrupter. When the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces conflicting interests to reciprocate. This delegation effect is expected to lower the level of corruption as compared to what arises in two-players settings. We set up two experiments varying in the exogeneity of the delegation relationship. The experime...

Cosigners as Collateral

We investigate the role of cosigners as collateral using data from a South Indian …nancial institution. Using an exogenous change in the cosigner requirement, we establish a negative causal e¤ ect of cosigners on defaults: an increase in the number of cosigners reduces defaults all else equal. Our results suggest that a one-sixth increase in the number of cosigners reduces the incidence of a de...

Commodities as Collateral∗

This paper proposes and tests a theory of using commodities as collateral for financing. In the presence of capital control and financial frictions, financial investors import commodities and pledge them as collateral to capture the higher expected return in the importing country. The collateral demand for commodities increases commodity prices globally; it also increases futures risk premium i...

Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor

Although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions, the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender's incentives to do this. Thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender's incentives to monitor. Covenants make a loan's effective maturity, and the ability to collateralize makes a loan's effective priority, contingent on monit...

Corruption